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ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT:  A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF MODEL RULE 
8.4(G) 
Claudia E. Haupt∗ 
The American Bar Association has added an antidiscrimination provision to the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, making it professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in harass-
ment or discrimination on several bases “in conduct related to the practice of law.” But crit-
ics argue that Model Rule 8.4(g) raises serious First Amendment concerns. This Essay pro-
vides a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First Amendment perspective. 
Using a conceptual framework of professional knowledge communities, this Essay examines 
the normative justifications underlying speech protection and the corresponding extent of 
permissible regulation in different contexts. So doing, it distinguishes “conduct related to the 
practice of law” from public discourse. When lawyers communicate with each other in “the 
practice of law,” they do not typically engage in public discourse. The regulatory efforts here 
occur in the space between the professional-client relationship and public discourse. This 
space is dominated by the interests of the knowledge community.  Thus, outside of public dis-
course, the justifications underlying First Amendment protection are generally compatible 
with a rule prohibiting discrimination in the practice of law. In public discourse, however, the 
interests underlying speech protection prohibit an expansive interpretation of “conduct relat-
ed to the practice of law.” 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Bar Association (ABA) at its Annual Meeting in August 
2016 adopted a new addition to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules).  The House of Delegates approved Model Rule 8.4(g),1 
making it professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in con-
duct related to the practice of law.”2  The change received a notable amount 
 
 ∗ Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Jack Balkin, 
Cort Kenney, Doug NeJaime, Allison Tait, and Alan Trammell, as well as participants in work-
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 1 Lorelei Laird, Discrimination and Harassment will be Legal Ethics Violations Under ABA Model 
Rule, ABA JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2016, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house_of_delegates_strongly_agrees_to_rule_making_d
iscrimination_and_harass. 
 2 ABA MODEL RULE 8.4(G).  The remainder of the new Model Rule states:  “This paragraph does 
not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accord-
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of popular press coverage.3  But critics argue that Model Rule 8.4(g) raises 
serious First Amendment concerns. 
This Essay offers a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First 
Amendment perspective.  The analysis lies at the undertheorized intersec-
tion of professional speech protection, regulation of the professions, and 
antidiscrimination law. The professions, as I have previously suggested, are 
best conceptualized as knowledge communities whose main reason for ex-
istence is the generation and dissemination of knowledge.4  The First 
Amendment should provide robust protection for professional speech—that 
is, speech between a professional and a client, within a professional-client 
relationship, and for the purpose of giving professional advice—against 
state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional 
advice.5  At the same time, the professions are self-regulating.6  The power 
to regulate the way in which professionals communicate with each other 
and their clients in pursuit of their professional activities, I suggest, is 
properly allocated to the professional knowledge community. 
Applying the conceptual framework of professional knowledge com-
munities allows us to analyze Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First Amendment 
perspective that puts the role of professionals front and center.  The norma-
tive justifications for First Amendment protection operate in a distinct way 
within professional knowledge communities—distinct in particular from 
the way in which they operate in public discourse.7  The regulatory efforts 
concerning the way in which lawyers communicate with their clients and 
with each other are occurring in the space between the professional-client 
relationship and public discourse, closer to the internal discourse of the 
knowledge community; I argue that this space is dominated by the interests 
 
ance with Rule 1.16.  This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent 
with these Rules.” 
 3 See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Bar Association Considers Striking ‘Honeys’ From the Courtroom, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 4, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2aE3Wkc (discussing the effort to add a model rule 
prohibiting harassment); Elizabeth Olson, Goodbye to ‘Honeys’ in Court, By Vote of American 
Bar Association, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2b4oiq7 (announcing the passing of 
8.4(g) by vote of the ABA); Ashley May, Lawyers, Stop Saying ‘Honey,’ ‘Sweetheart’ in Court, 
USA TODAY, (Aug. 10, 2016), http://usat.ly/2bgXumW (same). 
 4 Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016). 
 5 Id. For an example of such interference, see Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding state law requiring doctors to 
inform patients seeking an abortion of an increased risk of suicide to obtain informed consent).  
For an example of attempted state interference that was rejected on First Amendment grounds, 
see Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 2017 WL 632740 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (holding un-
constitutional as violating the First Amendment the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment 
provisions of the Florida Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act). 
 6 Haupt, supra note 4, at 1277-80 & n. 205 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 
10-11). 
 7 See id. at 1269-77 (examining professional speech and its relation to, and reliance upon, the con-
tinued integrity of the knowledge community). 
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of the knowledge community.  That is to say, when lawyers communicate 
with each other in “the practice of law,” they do not typically engage in 
public discourse.  They speak as professionals in the course of professional 
practice.8  Thus, even beyond the confines of the lawyer-client relationship, 
the normative justifications underlying First Amendment protection of pro-
fessional speech on the one hand, and speech in public discourse on the 
other hand, are generally compatible with a rule prohibiting discrimination 
in the practice of law. 
This Essay proceeds in three Parts.  Part I outlines the necessity and jus-
tifications for including an antidiscrimination provision in the Model Rules 
in light of increasing diversity in the legal profession, and gives a brief 
overview of past ABA and state bar activity in this area.  Part II addresses 
First Amendment free exercise and free speech concerns regarding the new 
Model Rule.  It situates these critiques within the contexts of current reli-
gion-based claims for exemptions from generally applicable antidiscrimina-
tion legislation, and of earlier discussions concerning First Amendment ob-
jections to Title VII workplace harassment law.  Part III applies the 
conceptual framework of professional knowledge communities to the legal 
profession and provides a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First 
Amendment perspective.  I suggest that in light of the interests underlying 
speech protection outside of public discourse, the First Amendment does 
not generally pose an obstacle to prohibiting discrimination within the legal 
profession by means of an antidiscrimination provision in the Model Rules.  
But in public discourse, the interests underlying speech protection do not 
justify the same limits as are permissible within the professional-client rela-
tionship. This counsels against an expansive interpretation of “conduct re-
lated to the practice of law.” 
I.  ABA AND STATE BAR ANTIDISCRIMINATION MEASURES 
The composition of the legal profession is changing.9  Women now 
constitute nearly half of the law student population.10  A third of the justic-
 
 8 Cf. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status 
of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999) (“The threshold determination for en-
forcement of professional norms will therefore be whether the speech is uttered in the course of 
professional practice and not merely whether the speech was uttered by a professional.”); Robert 
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician 
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (adhering to Halberstam’s definition). I adopt this defini-
tion.  See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1240 n.1. 
 9 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Advice for Living, N. Y. TIMES, (Oct. 1, 
2016) http://nyti.ms/2dtHcrW (discussing women in the legal profession and concluding, “[i]n 
my long life, I have seen great changes”). 
 10 Commission on Women in the Profession, A Current Glance at Women in the Law, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION 4 (May 2016) 
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es on the U.S. Supreme Court are women, as are roughly 30% of judges on 
the federal appellate and federal district courts.11  And yet, women and mi-
norities are still not adequately represented12 and the slowly shifting de-
mographics of the legal profession all too often still meet significant obsta-
cles.  As Deborah Rhode noted, “[o]ne irony of this nation’s continuing 
struggle for diversity and gender equity in employment is that the profes-
sion leading the struggle has failed to set an example in its own workplac-
es.  In principle, the bar is deeply committed to equal opportunity and so-
cial justice. In practice, it lags behind other occupations in leveling the 
playing field.”13 
In 1998, the ABA initially introduced some antidiscrimination language 
in its Comments to Model Rule 8.4, but not in the Model Rules them-
selves.14  Because upon adoption the comments are not designed to be 
binding,15 this was deemed insufficient.  In 2008, the ABA adopted the 
goal to “eliminate bias and enhance diversity.”16 
The two objectives of that goal are:  “1. Promote full and equal partici-
pation in the association, our profession, and the justice system by all per-
sons,” and, “2. Eliminate bias in the legal profession and the justice sys-
tem.”17  However, the scope of the Comment and goals was considered to 
leave uncovered important areas of professional activity beyond legal rep-
resentation of a client, such as “attorneys as advisors, counselors, and lob-
byists,” as well as attorneys working in various settings “such as law 
schools, corporate law departments, and employer-employee relationships 
within law firms.”18  Finally, the framework was not understood to “ad-
dress harassment at all.”19 
By the time the ABA proposed the new Model Rule in the summer of 
2016, several state bars had already adopted similar rules.  In 25 jurisdic-
 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_may2
016.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 11 Id. at 5. 
 12 See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Women and Blacks Make Little Progress at Big Law Firms, N. Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 19, 2015) http://nyti.ms/1O5EnbW (outlining the pattern of “flat to declining rep-
resentation” of women and minorities in law firms). 
 13 Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, 24 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041 (2011). 
 14 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, Revised Resolution 109 
(Report pp. 4-5), available online at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/final_re
vised_resolution_and_report_109.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter: Res. 109 Report] (discussing 
the need for amendment to Model Rule 8.4, to include an antidiscrimination provision in black 
letter law, not just the comments). 
 15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble & Scope para. 21. 
 16 Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 1. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 2. 
 19 Id. at 2. 
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tions, there are antidiscrimination rules,20 and in 13 jurisdictions, there are 
comments to rules similar to the previous ABA regime.21  Only 14 states 
have neither form of antidiscrimination provision.22  Moreover, Rule 2.3(C) 
of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct already contains the following 
provision: 
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from 
manifesting bias or prejudice, or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes 
including but not limited to race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnici-
ty, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or 
political affiliation, against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others.  
Against this backdrop, the ABA has now added a nondiscrimination 
provision to the rules governing lawyer conduct as a floor for the states to 
adopt.  One prominent legal ethics scholar has stated—perhaps somewhat 
optimistically—his expectation “that everyone would stipulate that such a 
rule’s objective is sound and probably long overdue,” before also noting 
“that deciding how to articulate such a standard is harder than it looks.”23  
The remainder of this Essay will evaluate the newly adopted Model Rule 
from a First Amendment perspective. 
 
 20 Id. at 5 (citing California Rule of Prof’l Conduct 2-400; Colorado Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); 
Florida Rule of Prof’l Conduct 4-8.4(d); Idaho Rule of Prof’l Conduct 4.4(a); Illinois Rule of 
Prof’l Conduct 8.4(j); Indiana Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); Iowa Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(e); Massachusetts Rule of Prof’l Conduct 3.4(i); 
Michigan Rule of Prof’l Conduct 6.5; Minnesota Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(h); Missouri Rule of 
Prof’l Conduct 4-8.4(g); Nebraska Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(d); New Jersey Rule of Prof’l 
Conduct 8.4(g); New Mexico Rule of Prof’l Conduct 16-300; New York Rule of Prof’l Conduct 
8.4(g); North Dakota Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(f); Ohio Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); Oregon 
Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(a)(7); Rhode Island Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(d); Texas Rule of 
Prof’l Conduct 5.08; Vermont Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); Washington Rule of Prof’l Conduct 
8.4(g); Wisconsin Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(i); D.C. Rule of Prof’l Conduct 9.1.). 
 21 Id. at 6 n. 12 (citing Arizona Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt.; Arkansas Rule of Prof’l Conduct 
8.4, cmt. [3]; Connecticut Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, Commentary; Delaware Lawyers’ Rule of 
Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Idaho Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Maine Rule of Prof’l 
Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; North Carolina Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [5]; South Carolina Rule 
of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; South Dakota Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Tennessee 
Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Utah Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Wyoming Rule 
of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; West Virginia Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3].). 
 22 Id. at 6 n. 13 (“The states that do not address this issue in their rules include Alabama, Alaska, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.). 
 23 Thomas D. Morgan, The Challenge of Writing Rules to Regulate Lawyer Conduct, 49 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 807, 821 (2016). 
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II.  FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
The First Amendment has arguably acquired a deregulatory character.24  
Its deregulatory thrust in this context is employed against a rule established 
by a self-regulating profession for members of the profession, governing 
their own communications with their clients and other professionals in the 
exercise of their profession.  Scholars and practitioners have raised First 
Amendment objections to Model Rule 8.4(g) that to a significant extent 
track arguments articulated in favor of religious exemptions from general 
antidiscrimination laws, and those articulated against Title VII workplace 
harassment law.  This Part presents and contextualizes those objections in 
turn. 
A.  Freedom of Religion 
Within parts of the legal profession, recent developments—in particu-
lar, the advent of marriage equality25—have led to some anxiety.  One 
commentator has concluded that professional rules could force divorce at-
torneys to handle same-sex divorces over their religious objections and ar-
gued for accommodation of these professionals.26  The argument hinges on 
legal services being a form of public accommodation.27  If legal services 
are in fact public accommodations, the argument goes, lawyers—like wed-
ding photographers,28 cake bakers,29 and florists30—may be compelled to 
render their services despite their religious objections.31  It is in this larger 
 
 24 See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
FORUM 165 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133; Elizabeth Sep-
per, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015). 
 25 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the right to marry is fundamen-
tal). 
 26 Bill Piatt, Opting Out in the Name of God:  Will Lawyers Be Compelled to Handle Same-Sex 
Divorces?, 79 ALB. L. REV. 683 (2016). 
 27 Id. at 697 (arguing that although there are “no cases which directly hold that legal services are a 
form of public accommodations” such a finding is likely in light of the treatment of other profes-
sions and a trend of “inclusion . . . of businesses under those statutes.”). 
 28 Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) 
(holding that a company refusing to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony discriminated 
on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act). 
 29 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. petition pending 
(holding that a cake shop owner’s refusal to create a same-sex couple’s wedding cake violated 
the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act). 
 30 State v. Arlene Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 94248 (Wash. Super. Jan. 7, 2015) 
(holding that the defendant must provide full wedding support for same-sex ceremonies regard-
less of personal beliefs). 
 31 See Piatt, supra note 26, at 685; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The ABA Decision to Control What 
Lawyers Say:  Supporting “Diversity” But Not Diversity of Thought, Heritage Foundation Legal 
Memorandum No. 191, Oct. 6, 2016, at 5, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/10/the-aba-decision-to-control-what-lawyers-say-
supporting-diversity-but-not-diversity-of-thought (“The existence of Rule 8.4(g) makes it easier 
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context that First Amendment objections are raised against general antidis-
crimination legislation.32  And, importantly, Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 
refers to substantive antidiscrimination law as providing guidance in the 
application of Model Rule 8.4(g). 
Representative of the religious freedom objections to Model Rule 
8.4(g), the Christian Legal Society33 and the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops34 raised numerous concerns in their comments on the 
draft of the proposed Model Rule.  They can be roughly divided into intra-
organizational concerns, that is, the relationship of the individual profes-
sional to the organization (in this case, the religious organization) into 
which he is embedded; and inter-professional concerns, that is, the relation-
ship of one professional to another, outside of the organizational structure. 
Intra-organizational concerns, which can affect many professionals,35 
raise a fundamental question:  is the professional within a religious organi-
zation primarily bound by the rules of the profession or by religious doc-
trine?  The objection here is to interference by the professional rules with 
the inner workings of the organization.  A conflict can potentially pit the 
religious identity of the organization against the professional identity of the 
employee.36  Objections to the Model Rule in this category include:  allow-
ing continued preference for coreligionists in hiring; providing advice on 
religion-based employee conduct standards; and allowing the organization-
al employer to enforce religion-based standards with respect to grooming 
and garb as well as bathroom and locker room access.37 
A related set of concerns goes to the role of lawyers as members of re-
ligious organizations, where they may serve on “boards of their churches, 
religious schools and colleges, and other religious non-profits.”38  These 
organizations “regularly turn to the lawyers serving as volunteers on their 
 
for a state court to find that refusing to represent a client or refusing to draft certain papers for a 
client violates that state’s general antidiscrimination laws.”). 
 32 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accom-
modations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014). 
 33 Letter of Christian Legal Society to ABA Ethics Committee, (March 10, 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_mo
del_rule%208_4_comments/nammo_3_10_16.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter: CLS Letter]. 
 34 Letter of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of the General Counsel, to ABA 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, (March 10, 2016),  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_mo
del_rule%208_4_comments/moses_3_11_16.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter: USCCB Letter]. 
 35 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ___, 11-16 (forthcom-
ing 2017) draft available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827762 (discussing various institutional 
settings in which professionals operate). 
 36 Cf. Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2012) (discuss-
ing religious hospitals). 
 37 USCCB Letter, supra note 34. 
 38 CLS Letter, supra note 33, at 7. 
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boards for pro bono guidance.”39  Here, too, the concern is that the new an-
tidiscrimination Model Rule will result in disciplinary actions against pro-
fessionals serving in such capacities. 
With respect to the inter-professional as well as lawyer-client relation-
ships, the USCCB and CLS letters emphasize that lawyers should be able 
to decline representation.  This is already regulated in Model Rule 1.16, 
and the final version of Model Rule 8.4(g) clarifies that “[t]his paragraph 
does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a 
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.”  With respect to general anti-
discrimination legislation, the USCCB letter states that taking particular re-
ligion-based positions in advocacy (i.e., representing the cake baker or de-
clining to draft a prenup for a same-sex couple) is problematic unless the 
new Model Rule clarifies that doing so is not professional misconduct.  
Here, too, the final version of the Model Rule states that it “does not pre-
clude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.” 
B.  Freedom of Speech 
Critics of Model Rule 8.4(g) also raised a range of free speech con-
cerns.  Ronald Rotunda, for example, contends that, with the new Model 
Rule, “the [ABA] decides to discipline lawyers who say something that is 
politically incorrect.”40 Similarly, Eugene Volokh articulates some of the 
key First Amendment-based critiques. He asserts that the ABA has created 
a “lawyer speech code,” and questions in particular the inclusion of dis-
crimination based on socioeconomic status.41 
The “lawyer speech code”-critique encompasses viewpoint discrimina-
tion and overbreadth concerns.  Volokh suggests that a lawyer who articu-
lates anti-marriage equality views, or argues in favor of “limits on immi-
gration from Muslim countries,” or who doubts “whether people should be 
allowed to use the bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity rather 
than their biological sex” in the context of a debate at a CLE event could be 
disciplined by the state bar if the new Model Rule were adopted.42  He as-
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Rotunda, supra note 31, at 2. 
 41 Eugene Volokh, A speech code for lawyers, banning viewpoints that express ‘bias,’ including in 
law-related social activities, The Volokh Conspiracy, WASHINGTON POST, (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-for-
lawyers-banning-viewpoints-that-express-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities-
2/?utm_term=.3431edcfba91 [hereinafter: Volokh, Speech Code]; Eugene Volokh, Banning law-
yers from discriminating based on ‘socioeconomic status’ in choosing partners, employees or 
experts, The Volokh Conspiracy, WASHINGTON POST, (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/banning-lawyers-
from-discriminating-based-on-socioeconomic-status-in-choosing-partners-employees-or-experts-
2/?utm_term=.0964096f87dd [hereinafter: Volokh, Socioeconomic Status]. 
 42 Volokh, Speech Code, supra note 41. 
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serts “that the ABA wants to . . . limit lawyers’ expression of viewpoints 
that it disapproves of.”43  Similarly, Rotunda claims, “The ABA rule is not 
about forbidding discrimination based on sex or marital status; it is about 
punishing those who say or do things that do not support the ABA’s partic-
ular view of sex discrimination or marriage.”44 
With respect to overbreadth, Volokh notes that the new Model Rule 
“goes beyond existing hostile-work-environment harassment law under Ti-
tle VII and similar state statutes,” which, he points out, “in most 
states . . . doesn’t include sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status 
or socioeconomic status.”45  He concludes that “there’s no reason for state 
bars or state courts to go beyond the existing state and federal anti-
discrimination categories when it comes to employment and similar mat-
ters.”46 
Finally, he criticizes the vagueness of the provision with respect to “so-
cioeconomic status,” a term not defined in the Model Rule or Comments.  
Activities that “might well lead to discipline” in his assessment include:  
“A law firm preferring more-educated employees . . . over less-educated 
ones,” or preferring those “who went to high-’status’ institutions, such as 
Ivy League schools.”  Similarly, disciplinary action may loom when choos-
ing a partner for the firm, “preferring a wealthier would-be partner over a 
poorer one.”  Beyond the firm’s employees, the provision may lead to dis-
ciplinary action for “contracting with expert witnesses and expert consult-
ants who are especially well-educated or have had especially prestigious 
employment.”47 
*  *  * 
These free speech clause-based critiques reflect and invoke arguments 
made in earlier debates surrounding First Amendment objections to Title 
VII workplace harassment law.  This is particularly relevant because 
Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 states that “[t]he substantive law of antidis-
crimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may guide applica-
tion of paragraph (g).”  It is therefore useful briefly to contextualize these 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Rotunda, supra note 31, at 7. 
 45 Volokh, Speech Code; see also Rotunda, supra note 31, at 6 (“Many states have no law banning 
gender identification [sic] discrimination.  Some states require that individuals use public re-
strooms that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates.  Congress has not enacted a statute 
banning discrimination based on gender identification.”). 
 46 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41. 
 47 Id. 
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arguments by revisiting, in Richard Fallon’s words, “the First Amendment 
dog that didn’t bark.”48 
Fallon noted that the absence of a First Amendment discussion in the 
landmark workplace harassment decision Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.49 
may “implicitly acknowledge[] that distinctive principles should apply to 
sexually harassing speech in the workplace.”50  After Harris, he concluded, 
“it is highly unlikely that workplace expressions of gender-based hostility 
and communications of explicitly sexual messages will receive categorical 
protection.”51  The upshot of that larger debate is that, some assertions to 
the contrary notwithstanding,52 Title VII workplace harassment law is gen-
erally not considered to violate the First Amendment.  Volokh, however, 
expressed some skepticism and cautioned that, in his assessment, at least 
some areas of workplace harassment law may be susceptible to First 
Amendment challenge.53  Thus, he suggested that “the Court ought to cre-
ate a new First Amendment exception that would allow much of harass-
ment law to stand.”54 
Jack Balkin identified three categories of arguments critics have made 
to assert “more radical First Amendment objections” to harassment law:  
“First, the courts’ standard of abusive conduct is unduly vague.  Second, 
sexual harassment doctrines are overbroad because they prohibit speech 
that would clearly be protected outside the workplace.  Third, sexual har-
assment doctrines make distinctions on the basis of content and view-
point.”55  Using the framework of captive audience doctrine, Balkin con-
cluded that “none of these objections prove fatal.”56  The vagueness 
objection, he asserted, “applies equally to most judge-made communica-
tions torts”, while the overbreadth objection fails because different First 
Amendment protection attaches to speech in different contexts:  “Often 
speech that would be protected in the public square becomes unprotected 
 
 48 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog 
That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 56. 
 49 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (defining hostile work environment under Title VII to include all circum-
stances with psychological harm not being a requirement for finding an abusive environment). 
 50 Fallon, supra note 48, at 2. 
 51 Id. at 9. 
 52 See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and 
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 481 (1991) (arguing that workplace harassment law is 
generally unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
 53 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992) 
(arguing that some forms of workplace harassment law may be unconstitutional as a First 
Amendment matter and introducing a directed/undirected speech framework to distinguish the 
two). 
 54 Id. at 1819. 
 55 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2306-07 
(1999). 
 56 Id. at 2307. 
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when it occurs in special social situations involving special social roles.”57  
And finally, the content and viewpoint discrimination objection fails be-
cause of the very reason that workplace harassment law exists in the first 
place:  “Title VII appropriately protects workers from a limited class of sta-
tus-based harms because protecting workers from these harms is essential 
to guaranteeing equality in the workplace.”58  But these conclusions only 
follow if the interests underlying employment discrimination law are fully 
considered in context.59  Likewise, Fallon endorsed the captive audience 
argument in the context of the workplace.60  Drawing on Robert Post’s the-
ory of public discourse, he, too, emphasized different spheres of First 
Amendment activity.61 
But, as the next Part will show, the interests underlying workplace har-
assment law do not always map onto the interests underlying Model Rule 
8.4(g).  Therefore, it is useful to untangle the two, and interrogate how First 
Amendment speech protection operates in relation to the new Model Rule.  
Doing so also sheds light on the extent to which drawing on substantive an-
tidiscrimination law for guidance, as Comment 3 expressly permits, will be 
useful.  Accordingly, the underlying justifications for speech protection 
must be evaluated in a context-specific manner. 
III.  REGULATING A PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY 
Taking the concept of the professions as knowledge communities as a 
starting point, this Part provides a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) 
against some of the First Amendment concerns just outlined.  Conceptual-
izing the professions as knowledge communities emphasizes their 
knowledge-based character.62  I have argued that “members of knowledge 
communities have shared notions of validity and a common way of know-
ing and reasoning (consider the old adage of thinking like a lawyer).”63  In 
addition to their shared knowledge basis, “the knowledge community 
shares certain norms and values:  professional norms.  This is not to say 
that knowledge communities are monolithic.  But their shared notions of 
validity limit the range of acceptable opinions found within them.”64  This 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 2318 (“Thus, it makes perfect sense that a sign saying ‘Sarah is Employee of the Month’ 
should not give rise to liability, while a sign reading ‘Sarah is a dumb-ass woman’ could form 
part of a hostile environment case.”). 
 59 Id. at 2307-08. 
 60 Fallon, supra note 48, at 43. 
 61 Id. at 48 (“As Robert Post has argued, political democracy requires a broad space for unrestricted 
‘public discourse,’ but that space need not be boundless.  Not all contexts are equal from the per-
spective of the First Amendment.”). 
 62 Haupt, supra note 4, at 1249. 
 63 Id. at 1251. 
 64 Id. 
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Part first explores the basis of professional advice before considering its 
scope. 
This Part then turns to the extent of permissible regulation of the pro-
fession.  The rules for professional communication in the legal profession 
can take various forms, including the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, among others:65  “Lawyers’ freedom of speech is constrained in many 
ways that no one would challenge seriously under the First Amendment.”66  
As Kathleen Sullivan has observed: “Rules of evidence and procedure, 
bans on revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions 
for frivolous pleadings, to name a few, are examples of speech limitations 
that are widely accepted as functional necessities in the administration of 
justice.”67 
It is important to distinguish the various contexts in which lawyers typi-
cally operate, because each context may have a different set of implications 
regarding the normative basis of First Amendment protection.  The respec-
tive justifications for speech protection determine whether regulation is 
permissible at all and, if so, how it ought to be configured.  Thus, in order 
to determine whether the antidiscrimination Model Rule is compatible with 
the First Amendment in each context, it is important first to fully under-
stand the interests at stake.  And because these interests may be different 
from the interests underlying workplace harassment and other forms of 
substantive antidiscrimination law, those areas, notwithstanding Comment 
3, may only provide limited guidance. 
A.  The Basis of Professional Advice 
Conceptualizing the professions as knowledge communities provides a 
framework to assess the basis upon which professional advice may be ren-
dered.  This informs the treatment of religious freedom concerns.  Personal 
beliefs—religious, political, or philosophical—can be either those of the 
professional or those of the client.  As I have argued more extensively 
elsewhere, professionals who base their advice on exogenous justifications 
place themselves outside of the knowledge community.68  The knowledge 
 
 65 Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“It is unquestionable that in the 
courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is 
extremely circumscribed.”). 
 66 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on 
Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998). 
 67 Id.  
 68 Claudia E. Haupt, Religious Outliers: Professional Knowledge Communities, Individual Con-
science Claims, and the Availability of Professional Services to the Public, in LAW, RELIGION, 
AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sep-
per eds. forthcoming 2017) (draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2809832). 
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community can appropriately circumscribe departures from professional 
knowledge to accommodate the professional’s personal beliefs.69 
The basis upon which valid legal arguments are made is limited to ar-
guments based on professional knowledge and shared ways of knowing and 
reasoning. A legal realist might instinctively protest; yet, even the legal re-
alist likely will concede that there is a difference between these two state-
ments: (a) your client is engaging in sinful behavior by doing X and needs 
to stop because a higher power says so, and (b) your client is seeking my 
client’s assistance in doing something the law recognizes as a burden on 
my client’s religious freedom.  The first is not a legally cognizable claim.  
It is not based on the accepted methodology of the knowledge community, 
that is, in this case, legal doctrine.  The second is a legally cognizable claim 
for a religious exemption on statutory or constitutional grounds.  It is based 
in legal doctrine, and thus based on the shared methodology of the 
knowledge community.  (Whether it will ultimately be a successful claim 
on the merits, however, is another matter.)  This is consistent with sentence 
3 of Model Rule 8.4(g) : “This paragraph does not preclude legitimate ad-
vice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.” The terms “advice” and 
“advocacy” presuppose a basis in legal doctrine, that is, the shared method-
ology of the profession, rather than exogenous factors such as the religious, 
political, or philosophical beliefs of the professional. 
A critic might object that this privileges professional identity over reli-
gious identity.  As the CLS letter explains, “Christians are enjoined by 
Scripture to bring their religious beliefs and practices to bear in their pro-
fessions – indeed, to see their professions as their ministries of service to 
others – and to apply their Christian principles to the practice of their pro-
fessions.”70  Indeed, a professional may be deeply motivated by her reli-
gious beliefs to practice her profession.  Nevertheless, under a theory that 
conceptualizes the professions as knowledge communities, the justification 
for professional advice—irrespective of the professional’s motivation—
ought to be based on the shared knowledge and methods of the profession.  
Within the lawyer-client relationship, correspondingly, the client’s expecta-
tion will be that legal advice will be rendered based on the insights of the 
legal profession.71 
 
 69 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Ethics, Personal Conscience, and Public Expectations, 
27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 233 (2016) (commentary on American Medical Association Opinion 
1.1.7, Physician Exercise of Conscience). 
 70 CLS letter, supra note 33, at 10. 
 71 See Haupt, supra note 35, at 22-25 (distinguishing motivations and justifications). 
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B.  The Range of Professional Advice 
Turning to the range of professional advice, the conceptual framework 
of the professions as knowledge communities likewise limits what may be 
rendered as valid legal advice.  And, indeed, the range of good professional 
advice is equally limited by the tort regime which imposes professional 
malpractice liability for bad advice.72 
Professional knowledge, moreover, evolves in the legal profession as it 
does in other professions.  What once was good professional advice may 
become outdated.73  If we think about legal doctrine as the profession’s 
shared methodology, there are doctrinal arguments that once were accepted 
but no longer are.  Put in the language of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, what once cleared the Rule 12(b)(6) bar may no longer clear the Rule 
11 bar. (And it is unlikely that the First Amendment provides a defense 
against Rule 11 sanctions.74) 
My claim here is not one of “political correctness,” as illustrated for ex-
ample by Rotunda’s contention that “[a] few years ago, it was politically 
incorrect to support gay marriage; now it is politically incorrect to oppose 
gay marriage.”75  Rather, it is one that concerns changes in legal doctrine 
over time.  There are cases that, if brought now, would play out much dif-
ferently than they might have just a half-decade (or less) ago.  For example, 
a lower court deciding whether a surviving same-sex spouse is entitled to 
the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses will now come to a 
different conclusion than what might have been doctrinally defensible in 
the past.76 
Quite apart from that, it may be problematic that major law firms are 
weary of representing clients with unpopular views.77  This is the type of 
scenario envisioned by Model Rule 1.2(b), which states:  “A lawyer’s rep-
resentation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not 
constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or mor-
al views or activities.”  This is also reiterated in Comment 5 to Model Rule 
8.4.  But an unpopular view may still be based on good law, and there may 
be a non-frivolous argument based in legal doctrine to be made to support 
it.78 
 
 72 See id. at 4. 
 73 See id. at 7. 
 74 See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 569. 
 75 Rotunda, supra note 31, at 7. 
 76 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 77 Adam Liptak, The Case Against Gay Marriage: Law Firms Won’t Touch It, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 
11, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1z71R5k. 
 78 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceed-
ing, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so 
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law.”). 
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C.  (Partially) Reconciling Speech Protection and the Antidiscrimination 
Model Rule 
What, then, are the First Amendment interests at stake, and how do they 
interact with Model Rule 8.4(g)?  Answering this question requires an ex-
amination of the different contexts in which lawyers communicate.  Com-
ment 4 states: “Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing 
clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and 
others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law 
firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business or social 
activities in connection with the practice of law.”  The following discussion 
breaks down the prototypical contexts into, first, the lawyer-client relation-
ship where the lawyer acts as the client’s advisor; second, the lawyer as ad-
vocate in the courtroom, in negotiations with another lawyer, or as advo-
cate or lobbyist outside the courtroom, interacting with other lawyers; and, 
third, the lawyer in public discourse. 
1.  Professional-Client Relationship 
When considering the lawyer-client relationship, two constellations 
have to be distinguished: formation of the lawyer-client relationship, and 
professional advice-giving within the lawyer-client relationship.  The un-
derlying interests diverge at these two distinct points in time, with implica-
tions for speech protection and the extent of permissible regulation. 
At the formation stage, the Model Rules provide that the lawyer may 
generally refuse representation, as is recognized in Model Rule 1.16 and 
reiterated in the second sentence of Model Rule 8.4(g).  Prohibiting dis-
crimination at the formation stage potentially puts the lawyer’s interests in 
tension with the client’s.  This tension is usually resolved once the lawyer-
client relationship has been formed.  (Of course, potential conflicts can 
arise again during the course of the representation, and Model Rule 1.16 
also provides for that scenario.) 
Once formed, for purposes of this discussion, the client’s and the law-
yer’s interests align.  The lawyer-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary 
duties; the lawyer has to act in the client’s best interest.  The client’s key 
interest lies in proper representation.  That the lawyer serves this client in-
terest is also ensured by the imposition of professional malpractice liabil-
ity.79  The fundamental concern here, however, is that the advice-giving at-
torney will refrain from advising the client in a way that would subject her 
to sanctions for violating Model Rule 8.4(g).  For example, the client wants 
 
 79 See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1286-87 (conceptualizing First Amendment protection for profes-
sional speech as coextensive with professional malpractice liability). 
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to make an anti-marriage equality argument and the lawyer is concerned 
she will be sanctioned for doing so. 
What if the Model Rule prohibits the lawyer from properly representing 
the client?  This seems to be at the heart of the religious freedom objections 
to the Model Rule.  Within the lawyer-client relationship, the First 
Amendment should provide robust protection against state interference.  
Yet, the interests underlying professional advice-giving are constrained by 
the duty to give good professional advice.80  In the context of giving legal 
advice, that means advice based on legal doctrine.  And so the third sen-
tence of Model Rule 8.4(g) states that it “does not preclude legitimate ad-
vice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”  Moreover, the ABA Report 
explicitly states that the new Model Rule “does not limit the scope of the 
legal advice a lawyer may render to clients.”81  And “legal advice” means 
advice based on the insights of the knowledge community.  All of this is 
generally consistent with a provision prohibiting discrimination in the prac-
tice of law. So understood, the antidiscrimination provision does not pro-
scribe offering doctrinally defensible arguments, even if those arguments 
might be colloquially described as “discriminatory.” 
2.  Professional-Professional Communications Related to the Practice 
of Law 
The potential target of discrimination in this context is opposing coun-
sel in the courtroom or other lawyers the professional encounters in the 
practice of law.  Here, it is again useful to divide the concerns into inter-
professional concerns and intra-organizational ones. 
The category of inter-professional concerns that has received the most 
attention in the press is that of courtroom interactions.82  Regulation of 
these interactions seems to be relatively uncontroversial; even critics of the 
new Model Rule agree that “State bars and state courts may reasonably im-
pose special rules on behavior in court, behavior with respect to witnesses, 
and the like.”83 
Another set of concerns raised by critics concerns CLE panels on con-
troversial issues.  Recall the program envisioned by Volokh “that included 
a debate on same-sex marriage, or on whether there should be limits on 
immigration from Muslim countries, or on whether people should be al-
lowed to use the bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity rather 
than their biological sex.  In the process, unsurprisingly, the debater on one 
side said something that was critical of gays, Muslims or transgender peo-
 
 80 See Haupt, supra note 35, at 3-4. 
 81 Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 8. 
 82 See supra note 3. 
 83 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41. 
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ple.”84  In his assessment, under the new Model Rule, “the debater could 
well be disciplined by the state bar.”85  Likewise, Rotunda is concerned 
about religious organizations, such as the St. Thomas More Society, as 
sponsors of CLE programs.86 
The interests at stake are guided by the purpose of such panels.  Unlike 
general political debates, CLE programs are designed to ensure that law-
yers “maintain the requisite knowledge and skill” to serve their clients 
competently.87  They are designed to ensure that lawyers base their profes-
sional advice on the methodological basis of their knowledge community: 
“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”88  Their 
primary purpose is not, however, for an individual lawyer to speak his own 
mind, which would be a key autonomy interest in public discourse.89 
So suppose the debaters at a CLE panel articulated the arguments ex-
pressed in the Chief Justice’s dissent in Obergefell,90 or in Justice Alito’s 
dissent from denial of certiorari in Stormans v. Wiesman, a case concerning 
the Washington law requiring pharmacies to stock medications some phar-
macists consider abortifacients,91 or Judge Niemeyer’s partial concurrence 
and dissent in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, a case concerning 
transgender bathroom access.92  These arguments would be squarely based 
on legal doctrine.  The range of competent professional advice is limited by 
the requirement of basing advice on a shared methodology—that is, legal 
doctrine—and making non-frivolous arguments.  Within the framework of 
the professions as knowledge communities, the CLE scenario is not a hard 
case. 
Intra-organizational concerns will likely be those within the lawyer’s 
firm.  Here, workplace harassment law is most salient.  Communication 
within the firm or the workplace indeed will continue to be governed by 
applicable workplace harassment law.93  “If state law bans, say, sexual ori-
entation discrimination in employment generally, that would normally ap-
 
 84 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 85 Volokh, Speech Code, supra note 411. 
 86 Rotunda, supra note 31, at 4-5. 
 87 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and 
skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits 
and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and 
comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”). 
 88 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1. 
 89 Cf. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1272—73 (distinguishing professional autonomy interests in the pro-
fessional speech context from autonomy interests in public discourse). 
 90 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 91 136 S. Ct. 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 92 822 F.3d 709, 730 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 93 See generally Alex B. Long, Employment Discrimination in the Legal Profession: A Question of 
Ethics?, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 445. 
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ply to law firms as well as to other firms.”94  The ABA Report, according-
ly, notes that Model Rule 8.4(g) “is not intended to replace employment 
discrimination law.”95 
The question, however, is whether the Model Rule can go beyond the 
categories recognized in applicable federal or state antidiscrimination law.  
The critics say no.96  With respect to new categories, “there’s no reason for 
state bars or state courts to go beyond the existing state and federal anti-
discrimination categories when it comes to employment and similar mat-
ters.”97 
But in a self-regulating profession,98 the interests cut exactly the other 
way.  If the power to regulate the profession is properly allocated to the 
profession itself, there is no reason to tether the categories of prohibited 
discrimination to the state.  This is especially true in the areas of sexual ori-
entation and gender identity where antidiscrimination legislation is lacking 
in most states,99 but the ABA has long ago adopted “policies promoting the 
equal treatment of all persons regardless of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.”100 
Consider also that municipalities do the same in going beyond the state 
in antidiscrimination law.  (This, of course, has caused some states to 
preempt local activities, such as most recently H.B. 2 in North Carolina 
where a Charlotte ordinance that included discrimination based on gender 
identity was preempted by the state.101)  If a city—on the standard justifica-
tions of being closer to those affected and more directly accountable—may 
go beyond the state in expanding protection, it is not obvious why the state 
bar should not be able to do so, on even stronger theoretical footing, with 
respect to a self-regulating profession. 
The “socioeconomic status” category appears to be the least commonly 
adopted elsewhere.102  As mentioned earlier, it appears in Rule 2.3 (C) of 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.103  The ABA Report cites a discipli-
nary case in which “a lawyer was reprimanded for disparaging references 
 
 94 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41. 
 95 Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 11. 
 96 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41 (stating that state bars and courts shouldn’t over-
step state and federal categories); Rotunda, supra note 31, at 6 (discussing that the rule applies 
even without state or federal law bans). 
 97 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41. 
 98 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10-11. 
 99 Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information—Map, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Mar. 
18, 2017, 6:24 PM). 
100 Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 12. 
101 Act of March 23, 2016, 2016 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis). 
102 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41 (“To my knowledge, no state anti-discrimination 
law prohibits such discrimination.”). 
103 See supra Part I. 
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he made at trial about a litigant’s socioeconomic status” as providing guid-
ance.104  Volokh notes that courts have defined the term as it is used in the 
Sentencing Guidelines as “an individual’s status in society as determined 
by objective criteria such as education, income, and employment.”105  
Moreover, commentators have previously suggested introducing this cate-
gory into the legal ethics rules.106  Ultimately, the question is not whether 
adding a new category is impermissible; it is whether the profession con-
siders doing so wise.  It will generally be possible for courts to adjudicate 
claims based on a (more or less) new category. But, by the same reasoning 
which applied to sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, it 
should be up to the profession to decide which categories to include beyond 
the ones recognized by state or federal antidiscrimination law. 
3.  Social Interactions and Public Discourse 
The final, and most problematic, area covered by the Model Rule con-
cerns social interactions of lawyers. Comment 4 identifies “participating in 
bar association, business, or social activities in connection with the practice 
of law.”107  The ABA Report describes lawyers as “public citizens”108 who 
are bound by the disciplinary rules when participating in such activities.  
These include “law firm dinners and other nominally social events at which 
lawyers are present solely because of their association with their law firm 
or in connection with their practice of law.”109  From a First Amendment 
perspective, this is thorny.  The ABA Report is cognizant of the problem, 
stating that “[t]he proposed rule is constitutionally limited; it does not seek 
to regulate harassment or discrimination by a lawyer that occurs outside the 
scope of the lawyer’s practice of law.”110  The Report contends that “[t]he 
nexus of the conduct regulated by the rule is that it is conduct lawyers are 
permitted or required to engage in because of their work as a lawyer.”111  
But despite these attempts to clarify, the boundary between “social activi-
ties” and public discourse remains fuzzy. 
 
104 Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 13 (citing In re Campiti, 937 N.E.2d 340 (2009)). 
105 Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41 (citing United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 393, 
n.14 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Graham, 946 F.2d 19, 21 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Untied 
States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
106 See, e.g., Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession 
or Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1113-16 
(2011) (noting that Model Rule 8.4 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, 
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Whereas professionals are bound to communicate the knowledge com-
munity’s insights within the professional-client relationship, they are free 
to challenge those insights in public discourse.112  The line here is the pres-
ence or absence of a professional-client relationship.113 And while the un-
derlying interests may permit regulation of a professional’s speech in the 
practice of their profession, those interests are likely absent in public dis-
course. As Robert Post noted, 
There are circumstances in which speech ought to be regulated according to 
principles quite distinct from those that underlie public discourse. To offer only 
an obvious example, speech that is appropriately protected when it occurs with-
in public discourse is also appropriately regulated as racial or sexual harass-
ment when it occurs within the context of an employment relationship. This is 
true because there are good reasons for the law to regard persons as autono-
mous within the context of political deliberation, but there are equally good 
reasons for the law to regard persons as dependent within the workplace.114 
Imagine a lawyer attending a bar dinner reiterating, and agreeing with, 
the then-GOP presidential nominee’s view that judges of Mexican heritage 
are unable to serve impartially in cases involving the nominee’s business 
ventures.  This is core political speech; moreover, assessing the fairness of 
the judicial process is at the core of discussions among members of the le-
gal profession.  But whereas the professional speaker is constrained by the 
standards of the profession in the context of the professional-client rela-
tionship, such constraints are  absent in public discourse. To take only the 
professional’s autonomy interests as an example, in the professional con-
text, “the professional speaker has a unique autonomy interest in communi-
cating her message according to the standards of the profession to which 
she belongs;” the interest of the individual professional in public discourse 
is to speak her own mind.115  Thus, from a First Amendment perspective, 
regulation at this point is on constitutionally weak footing. 
CONCLUSION 
A contextual analysis that untangles the distinctive interests underlying 
workplace discrimination, general antidiscrimination legislation, and the 
interests of the legal profession in ending discrimination in the practice of 
law allows a more nuanced assessment of whether, and to what extent, 
Model Rule 8.4(g) is compatible with the First Amendment.  Considering 
these interests also reveals that guidance of general antidiscrimination law 
pursuant to Comment 3 is likely limited. 
 
112 See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1255-57. 
113 Id. at 1254-55. 
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REV. 1744, 1746 (1990). 
115 See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1272-73. 
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The narrow, but important, insight this analysis offers is that, conceptu-
ally, the First Amendment is not a roadblock to regulation of professionals’ 
speech by the profession via an antidiscrimination provision.  At the same 
time, “conduct related to the practice of law” must be more clearly distin-
guished from public discourse.  One prominent scholar of the legal profes-
sion predicted with respect to Model Rule 8.4(g) that “whatever proposal is 
actually adopted likely will be further amended.”116  From a First Amend-
ment perspective, outside of public discourse, no principled objection to the 
antidiscrimination provision emerges.  Within public discourse, however, 
the interests underlying speech protection counsel against an expansive in-
terpretation of “conduct related to the practice of law.” 
 
116 Morgan, supra note 233, at 823. 
